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Abstract
Background: Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests.
While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with
different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can
yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from
the viewpoint of another.
Methodology and Principal Findings: To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and
between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and
different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These
equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma be
promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other
mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even
revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests?
Conclusions and Significance: Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are
relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well.
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Introduction
In order to gain a better understanding of factors preventing or
promoting cooperation among humans or other species, biologists,
economists, social scientists, mathematicians and physicists have
intensively studied game theoretical problems such as the prisoner’s
dilemma and the snowdrift game (also known as chicken or hawk-
dove game) [1–5]. In all these games, a certain fraction of people or
even everyone is expected to behave uncooperatively (see Fig. 1).
Therefore, a large amount of research has focused on how
cooperation can be supported by mechanisms such as
N repeated interactions [1,6–8],
N reputation [9–12],
N clusters of cooperative individuals [13,14],
N sanctioning [15–21],
N success-driven migration [22], or
N economic incentives [23].
For a discussion and classification of cooperation-promoting
mechanisms within an evolutionary game-theoretical framework
see Refs. [3,24,25].
Many game-theoretical studies of social cooperation are based
on models, in which all individuals are assumed to have the same
properties. In reality, however, individuals are different. To
investigate the relevance of this for the resulting outcome and
dynamics of social interactions, we will consider that people of
different gender, status, age, or cultural background may have
heterogeneous preferences (e.g. due to framing effects, see [27–30].
We will focus here on the case where the preferences are not only
gradually different, but where we have two interacting populations
with mutually incompatible preferences, which cannot be satisfied
at the same time. For example, men and women appear to have
incompatible interests many times. Nevertheless, they normally
interact among and between each other on a daily basis. It is also
more and more common that people with different religious beliefs
live and work together, while their religions request some mutually
incompatible behaviors (in terms of the working days and free
days, the food one may eat or should avoid, the headgear, or
appropriate clothing, etc.). A similar situation applies, when people
with different mother tongues meet or businessmen from countries
with different business practices make a deal. In this contribution,
we are interested in identifying factors, which determine whether
two such populations go their own way, find a common
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understand the relevance of power in the rivalry of populations
[32].
Our treatment of heterogeneous preferences is based on multi-
population games [33–37]. The simpler case where individuals of
two different populations interact with each other, while they do not
interact when belonging to the same population, has been nicely
summarized by [26], pp. 182ff. An earlier publication on the self-
regulation of behavior in animal societies also considers self-
interactions within each population [38]. In fact, most applications
of multi-population models in evolutionary game theory so far
were oriented at the interaction of biological species and the study of
ecosystems [39–43]. Compared to these publications, our treatment
focuses on social systems, and effects of differences in the power of
interacting populations are considered. The problem of conflicts
between social groups has been studied before by bimatrix games
[44] such as the ‘‘battle of sexes’’ (see, e.g., [35] and by so-called
hypergames (see, e.g., [45]. However, the related models appear to
be less versatile than the one proposed in the following. The main
difference to previous approaches is that we study social
interactions between and within populations, considering that the
power of the involved populations may be different. This generates
interesting kinds of system dynamics, which do not appear when
self-interactions (between individuals of the same population) are
neglected or if all populations are equally strong. For example, we
find that it may not only depend on the payoffs, but also on the
initial condition, whether the individuals of two populations with
incompatible preferences finally show a commonly shared
behavior (see Sec. Evolution of normative behavior in the stag hunt game).
Note that this paper presents more than ‘‘just another model’’.
First of all, our approach fits particularly well into widely
established modeling concepts. Second, it bridges between two
different modeling worlds by unifying features of game-theoretical
and opinion dynamics models (see Sec. Discussion of previous literature
on norms). Third, the model is analytically tractable [46]. Fourth, it
contains very few parameters, while it describes a variety of
different system behaviors (although it was not explicitly
constructed for this). Despite 3 parameters only (which can be
further reduced, since only the signs and quotient of the
parameters B and C matter), the model shows a surprisingly rich
behavior and can reproduce a variety of phenomena observed in
social systems: (1) the breakdown of cooperation, (2) the
coexistence of different behaviors (the establishment of ‘‘subcul-
tures’’), (3) the evolution of commonly shared behaviors (‘‘social
norms’’), and (4) the occurrence of social polarization, conflict, or
revolutions. The approach can also be cast into an agent-based
model. In fact, agent-based models for the establishment of norms
have found a lot of interest, recently [47–60].
Modeling Approach
The crucial point of our modeling approach is to adapt the
game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations
[35,38,46,61] in a way that reflects interactions between
individuals with incompatible preferences (see Sec. Methods). The
resulting equations (1) and (2) describe the time evolution of the
proportions p(t) and q(t) of cooperative individuals in populations 1
and 2, respectively, as individuals imitate more successful
behaviors in their own population. Their success depends on the
‘‘payoffs’’ quantifying the results of social interactions, i.e., on the
own behavior and the behavior of the interaction partner(s).
In order to reflect incompatible interests of both populations, we
assume that population 1 prefers behavior 1, while population 2
prefers behavior 2. If an interaction partner shows the behavior
preferred by oneself, we call this behavior ‘‘cooperative’’,
otherwise uncooperative. Accordingly, behavior 1 is cooperative
from the viewpoint of population 1, but uncooperative from the
viewpoint of population 2 (and vice versa). Furthermore, if an
individual of population 1 interacts with an individual of
population 2 and both display the same behavior, we call this
behavior ‘‘coordinated’’. Finally, if the great majority of individuals
in both populations shows a coordinated behavior (in case of a
commonly shared behavior), we speak of ‘‘normative behavior’’ or
a ‘‘behavioral norm’’. To establish a social norm, one of the
populations has to give up its preferred behavior.
What will be the resulting dynamics and outcome of such
interactions? Under what conditions will we find ‘‘normative
behavior’’ (although neither the relative sizes of both populations
nor their incompatible preferences change in our model)? To
answer these questions, the payoffs from social interactions in 2|2
games are represented by T, R, P, and S, as usual (see Sec. Methods
for details). In the prisoner’s dilemma, the meaning of these
parameters is ‘‘Temptation’’ to behave non-cooperatively, ‘‘Re-
ward’’ for mutual cooperation, ‘‘Punishment’’ for mutual non-
cooperative behavior and ‘‘Sucker’s payoff’’ for a cooperative
Figure 1. Illustration of the types and outcomes of a game-
dynamical treatment of one-population symmetrical 262
games as a function of the two model parameters B and C
(see, e.g., [26], pp. 28ff). B and C are related to the four payoffs P, R,
S, and T of symmetrical 262 games via the relations B=S2P and
C=R2T, see Sec. Methods for details. The payoff is R, if two interacting
individuals show behavior 1, but P, if both of them show behavior 2.
When the interaction partners show different behaviors, the one
showing behavior 1 receives the payoff S and the other one the payoff
T. In the prisoner’s dilemmas (PD), behavior 1 corresponds to
cooperation and behavior 2 to defection. R is then called the ‘‘reward’’
for mutual cooperation, P the ‘‘punishment’’ for mutual defection, T the
‘‘temptation’’ for unilateral defection, and S the ‘‘sucker’s payoff’’ for
unilateral cooperation. As the prisoner’s dilemma is characterized by the
inequalities TwRwPwS, we have Bv0 and Cv0, and defection (‘‘free-
riding’’, ‘‘cheating’’) is the dominant strategy. For snowdrift games (SD)
with TwRwSwP, which are also called chicken or hawk-dove games,
we have Bw0 and Cv0, and uncooperative behavior is tempting. The
stable stationary solution corresponds to a coexistence of a fraction
p0 =|B|/(|B|+|C|) of cooperators with a fraction 1{p0 of defectors
(uncooperative individuals). For harmony games (HG) with RwTwSwP,
we have Bw0 and Cw0, and everybody will eventually cooperate.
Finally, for stag hunt games (SH) with RwTwPwS, which are also called
assurance games, we have Bv0 and Cw0. Here, cooperation is
uncertain, as the situation is bistable: If the initial fraction p0 of
cooperators is larger than p0 =|B|/(|B|+|C|), everybody is expected to
cooperate in the end, otherwise everybody will eventually behave
uncooperatively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.g001
Cooperation,Norms,Revolutions
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 October 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | e12530individual meeting an uncooperative one (see Fig. 1). The related
game-dynamical replicator equations contain two payoff-depen-
dent parameters, B=S2P and C=R2T. C may be interpreted as
gain by coordinating on one’s own preferred behavior (if greater
than zero, otherwise as loss). B reflects the gain when giving up
coordinated, but non-preferred behavior. Equations (1) and (2)
contain a further parameter f, which can be interpreted as
‘‘(relative) power’’ of population 1 (while 12f would correspond to
the relative power of population 2). The relative power may
represent the relative size of the populations, but also differences in
their material resources (money, weapons, etc.), social capital
(status, social influence, etc.), and other factors (charisma, moral
persuasion, etc.). It reflects how much influence a population has
on the behavioral choice of individuals. When a population has a
greater relative power than another one, we call it ‘‘stronger’’, if it
has less power, we call it ‘‘weaker’’. Details of the model and some
generalizations are provided in Methods.
Results
We have solved Eqs. (1) and (2) by numerical simulation for
different parameter values B, C, and f and different initial
conditions p(0) and q(0). In contrast to the computer-based analysis
presented here, a mathematical analysis of the stationary (i.e. time-
invariant) solutions and their stability properties has been carried
out in a complementary paper [46]. While the linear stability
analysis reveals the sensitivity to stochastic fluctuations (random
effects, ‘‘noise’’), the sensitivity to parameter variations is captured
by so-called phase diagrams. Here, we will not go into these
technicalities, but rather discuss representative examples of the
different kinds of system dynamics and their relevance for social
systems.
We find that social interactions with incompatible interests do
not necessarily produce conflict—they may even promote mutual
coordination. Depending on the signs of B and C, which determine
the character of the game, we have four archetypical situations:
1. In games like the multi-population prisoner’s dilemma (MPD), we have
Bv0 and Cv0.
2. In the multi-population harmony game (MHG), we have Bw0 and
Cw0.
3. Bv0 and Cw0 applies to games like the multi-population stag hunt
game (MSH).
4. The multi-population snowdrift game (MSD) is characterized by
Bw0 and Cv0.
In a multi-population prisoner’s dilemma with incompatible
preferences (MPD), everybody behaves non-cooperatively in the
end (see Fig. 2). This does not even change, if one population is
stronger than the other one (i.e. f=1=2, or if the interaction rate
between populations is different from the interaction rate within
populations. This disappointing outcome results despite the fact
that non-cooperative behavior in one population corresponds to
cooperative one from the perspective of the other. However, as
non-cooperative individuals earn a high payoff (the temptation T),
when meeting a non-cooperative individual of the other
population (it is cooperative from the own perspective), there is
no incentive to give up defection in their own population—on the
contrary.
In contrast, in the multi-population harmony game, everybody
finally shows a cooperative behavior in the own population, but
due to the different preferences, the behaviors in both populations
are not coordinated. (Every population just does what it likes, as if
both populations had their own ‘‘subcultures’’, see Fig. 2).
Figure 2. Simulation results for two interacting populations with self-interactions and incompatible preferences playing prisoner’s
dilemmas or harmony games. The outcome is visualized by vector fields (small arrows) and sample trajectories (large arrows) for f=0.8 (i.e.
population 1 is assumed to be stronger than population 2). p denotes the fraction of individuals in population 1 showing their preferred, cooperative
behavior 1, and q is the fraction of cooperative individuals in population 2 showing their preferred behavior 2. A fraction 12q of individuals in
population 2 shows the non-preferred behavior 1, and a fraction 12p of individuals in population 1 shows behavior 2. The vector fields show (dp/
dt,dq/dt), i.e. the direction and size of the expected temporal change of the behavioral distribution, if the fractions of cooperative individuals in
populations 1 and 2 are p(t) and q(t). Sample trajectories illustrate some representative flow lines (p(t),q(t)) as time t passes. The flow lines move away
from unstable stationary points (empty circles) and are attracted towards stable stationary points (black circles). Saddle points (crosses) are attractive
in one direction, but repulsive in another. The colored areas represent the ‘‘basins of attraction’’, i.e. all initial conditions (p(0),q(0)) leading to the same
stable fix point [red=(0,0), yellow=(1,1)]. Intuitively, the initial conditions quantify the influence of the previous history. (A) If B=C=21, the
individuals in each population are facing prisoner’s dilemma interactions and end up with non-cooperative behavior. (B) If B=C=1, individuals in
each population are playing a harmony game instead, and everybody eventually behaves cooperatively. The results look similar when the same two-
population games are played with different values of f,| B|o r| C|.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.g002
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the multi- population stag hunt and snowdrift games with
incompatible preferences are more complicated and in marked
contrast to the corresponding one-population games. This can be
demonstrated by systematically exploring the parameter space
with computer simulations. In the following, we will illustrate
typical simulation results by figures and movies showing the
stationary solutions (fix points, evolutionary equilibria) of the
games, their basins of attraction, and representative flow lines.
Details are discussed below and in the captions of Figs. 2–5 (see
also Movies S1, S2, and S3 and Methods).
Evolution of normative behavior in the stag hunt game
The one-population stag hunt game is characterized by an
equilibrium selection problem [62]: Everyone is finally expected to
cooperate, if the initial fraction of cooperative individuals is above
p0 =|B|/(|B|+|C|), otherwise nobody will behave cooperatively in
the end (see Fig. 1). The same applies to non-interacting populations
(see Movie S1). For interacting populations without self-interactions,
however, it never happens in the multi-population stag-hunt game
with incompatible preferences that everybody or nobody cooper-
ates in both populations (otherwise there should be yellow or red
areas in the second part of Movie S2). Although both populations
prefer different behaviors, all individuals end up coordinating
themselves on a commonly shared behavior (corresponding to the
blue and green areas in Movie S2). This can be interpreted as self-
organized evolution of a social norm (see below).
Note that the previously discussed cases, which neglect
interactions between populations or within populations, are applica-
ble to particular social systems only. Normally, however, there are
interactions between different populations and, at the same time,
interactions between individuals of the same population (‘‘self-
interactions’’). If this is taken into account, the case where
everybody or nobody cooperates in both populations is still
possible, but it requires that both populations have similar power
(f&1=2) and that the initial levels of cooperation, p(0) and q(0), are
comparable as well. Under such conditions, both populations may
develop separate, coexisting norms (see yellow area in Fig. 3B and
Figure 3. Simulation results for two interacting populations with self-interactions and incompatible preferences, playing stag hunt
games. The corresponding vector fields (small arrows), sample trajectories (large arrows) and phase diagrams (colored areas) were determined for
Bv0 and Cw0. The representation is the same as in Fig. 2. In particular, the colored areas represent the basins of attraction, i.e. all initial conditions
(p(0),q(0)) leading to the same stable fix point (stationary solutions) [yellow=(1,1), blue=(0,1), green=(1,0)]. The dashed diagonal line represents an
infinite number of unstable fix points. The model parameters are as follows: (A) |B|=|C|=1 and f=0.8, i.e. population 1 is more powerful than
population 2, (B) |C|=2|B|=2 and f=1/2, i.e. both populations are equally strong, (C) |C|=2|B|=2 and f=0.8, (D) 2|C|=|B|=2 and f=0.8. Due to the
asymptotically stable fix points at (1,0) and (0,1), all individuals of both populations finally show the behavior preferred in population 1, when starting
in the green area, or the behavior preferred in population 2, when starting in the blue area. This case can be considered to describe the evolution of a
shared behavioral norm. Only for similarly strong populations (f&1/2) and similar initial fractions p(0) and q(0) of cooperators in both populations
(yellow area), both populations will end up with population-specific norms (‘‘subcultures’’), corresponding to the asymptotically stable point at (1,1).
The route towards the establishment of a shared norm may be quite unexpected, as the flow line starting with the white circle shows: The fraction
q(t) of individuals in population 2 who are uncooperative from the viewpoint of population 1 may grow in the beginning, but later on go down
dramatically. Therefore, a momentary trend does not allow one to easily predict the final outcome of the struggle between two interest groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.g003
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however, both populations establish a commonly shared norm and
either end up with behavior 1 (green area in Fig. 3) or with
behavior 2 (blue area).
The behavior of Eqs. (1) and (2) becomes better understandable
for multi-population games with the payoffs P=c, R=b+c, S=b,
and T=0, where the payoff b reflects the benefit of showing the
preferred behavior, while c is the payoff for showing coordinated
behavior (reflecting the reward for conforming with the behavior
of the interaction partner). While these payoffs do not correspond
to a stag hunt game, for cw0 and 2cvbvc they also lead to
B=b2cv0 and C=b+cw0, which implies exactly the same
solutions. One advantage of this formulation besides the better
interpretation is the possibility to extend it to simultaneous
interactions with several players.
For the sake of illustration of this specification, assume that
individuals of population 1 like to be properly dressed at the beach
and individuals of population 2 enjoy to be naked (bw0), but even
more than doing what they like, everybody prefers to conform
with the behavior of the interaction partners (cwb). In situations,
when naked people and those wearing a swimming suit interact
with each other at the same part of the beach, our equations allow
one to identify conditions under which one population eventually
sets the behavioral standards or under which a mixture of both
behaviors persists. (In contrast to the related multi-population
game without self-interactions, see Movie S2, there is a possibility
that the two populations do not coordinate their behaviors, and
everybody ends up doing what he or she likes.) Note that, if both
populations interact in space, dressed people and nudists may
segregate, even when there was no disapproval between both
behaviors. As a consequence, there may be different ‘‘(sub-)
cultures’’ in different parts of the beach, as is often observed. This
becomes understandable by the circumstance that the effect of
mutual disapproval of the non-preferred behavior (which may be
described by the payoffs P=0, R=b, S=b2c, and T=2c) again
leads to B=b2cv0 and C=b+cw0. Therefore, the same kind of
dynamics results as in the case where there is a tendency to
conform with others.
In conclusion, due to the payoff structure of the multi-
population stag hunt game and other multi-population games
with Bv0 and Cw0, it can be profitable to coordinate oneself with
the prevailing behavior in the other population. Yet, the
establishment of a norm requires the individuals of one population
to give up their own preferred behavior in favor of the one
preferred by the other population. Therefore, it is striking that the
preferred behavior of the weaker population can actually win
through and finally establish the norm (see blue areas in
Figs. 3A,C,D). Who adapts to the preferred strategy of the other
population essentially depends on the initial fractions of behaviors
(and, thereby, on the previous history). The majority behavior in
the beginning is likely to determine the resulting behavioral norm,
but a powerful population is in a favorable position: The area of
possible histories leading to an establishment of the norm preferred
by population 1 tends to increase with power f (compare the size of
the green areas in Figs. 3B+C).
Discussion of the equilibrium selection problem
As was indicated already, when two populations with incom-
patible preferences interact among and between each other, the
behavior of the stag hunt game changes completely: Then, the
values of the payoff-dependent parameters B and C have an
influence on the stable stationary solutions, and inner stationary
points (p,q) with 0vp,qv1 disappear, if DBD=DCD [46].
It is noteworthy that, without interactions between populations,
the stag hunt game implies an interesting equilibrium selection
problem [6,100–102], since it has several stable solutions. These are
classified as payoff-dominant solution (which maximizes the
individual payoff, if the interaction partner decides in the same
way) and risk-dominant solution (which ‘‘minimizes the maximum
damage’’, i.e. maximizes the individual payoff for the worst-case
choice of the interaction partner and corresponds to non-
cooperative behavior). Which of these solutions is selected depends
on the initial conditions, and there is a monotonous increase or
decrease of the fraction p(t) of cooperative individuals in the
course of time t. In the one-population stag hunt game, the
payoff-dominant solution corresponds to cooperative behavior by
everybody (limt?? p(t)~1). It is selected, if the initial fraction p(0)
of cooperative individuals is above the value p0~DBD=(DBDzDCD) of
the unstable stationary solution. Instead, the risk-dominant
solution results for p(0)vp0 and corresponds to non-cooperative
behavior by everyone (limt?? p(t)~0).
In the multi-population games with interactions across popula-
tions, the risk-dominance concept is not sufficient to understand
the dynamics and outcome of the game. For example, when two
populations with incompatible preferences play stag hunt games
without self-interactions, the game is of the ‘‘battle of sexes’’ type,
and there are no thresholds that would separate payoff-dominant
from risk-dominant solutions [35,46]. When both, interactions and
self-interactions are considered, the inner stationary point
disappears whenever DBD=DCD. The unstable solution is rather
located at the boundary or in one of the corners. Moreover, as
Figs. 3C and 3D illustrate, the incompatibility of preferences can
Figure 4. Illustration of the finally resulting system state for the
two-population stag hunt game with interactions and self-
interactions, and incompatible preferences. The outcome is
displayed as a function of the relative strength f of population 1 and
the ratio b=c between the benefit b of showing the preferred behavior
and the benefit c of showing coordinated behavior. If bwc, individuals
always show the behavior they prefer. However, if bƒc, a commonly
shared behavior (i.e. a ‘‘social norm’’) may result, depending on the
respective initial conditions. The initial commitments p(0) and q(0) to
the respectively preferred behavior determine also, who sets the norm.
If all individuals initially show the behavior they prefer (i.e.
p(0)~q(0)~1, as assumed in the above illustration), the stronger
population sets the norm, given the difference between both
population strengths, f and (1{f), is larger than a certain threshold.
Otherwise, individuals in each population show their preferred
behavior. The threshold depends on the relative strength f and the
size of b=c, i.e. the fraction of the relevant payoffs b and c. It can, in
principle, be determined from analytical results derived in Ref. [46].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.g004
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the fractions p(t) and q(t) of cooperative individuals (i.e. p’(0)w0
and q’(0)w0, where p’(t)~dp(t)=dt and q’(t)~dq(t)=dt) does not
imply that the system will end up in the stationary solution (1,1).
While there still exists a payoff- and a risk-dominant solution for
the stronger population, there is no threshold behavior for the
weaker population, as Figs. 3B+C show.
In the limiting case where the relative size f of population 1 goes
to one, the resulting fraction of cooperative individuals in
population 2 is completely determined by the initial fraction p(0)
of cooperative individuals in population 1, while the initial fraction
q(0) of cooperative individuals in population 2 does not have any
influence. No matter whether population 1 selects the payoff-
dominant solution (for large enough values of p(0)) or the risk-
dominant solution (for small values of p(0)), the behavior in
population 2 is always coordinated with population 1 in the end
[46]. The risk-dominant case can be interpreted such that
population 2 effectively manages to set the norm. Figure 4 shows
the parameter dependence for the general case, using the
alternative parametrization B~b{c and C~bzc, where b is
the benefit of showing the preferred behavior and c is the benefit
of showing coordinated behavior. The classical coordination
game, where individuals always form a behavioral convention
(i.e. coordinate on a behavioral norm) results for b~0 [61].
Discussion of previous literature on norms
Note that the subject of social norms is a multi-faceted research
field, and there is no single, generally accepted definition of what
norms are [63–66]. Definitions range from the concept of
‘‘oughtness’’ [67] to a behavioral regularity or shared behavior
with a sanctioning (‘‘punishment’’) of non-conforming behavior
[20,68–77]. However, not all authors agree on the necessity of the
sanctioning element [78,79]. In our manuscript, we define
‘‘normative behavior’’ or a ‘‘behavioral norm’’ as a situation in
which behaviors are shared among a large majority of individuals.
The question of how behavioral consensus may evolve has been
addressed by opinion dynamics models such as voter models [55]
or models of in- and out-group interactions [59,80]. The currently
most common approach to behavioral norms is based on game
theory and relates the issue to ultimatum games [62,65,78], stag
Figure 5. Two interacting populations with self-interactions and incompatible preferences, playing snowdrift games. The
corresponding vector fields (small arrows), sample trajectories (large arrows) and phase diagrams (colored areas) were determined for Bw0 and Cv0.
The flow lines move away from unstable stationary points (empty circles) and are attracted towards stable stationary points (black circles and solid
diagonal line). Saddle points (crosses) are attractive in one direction, but repulsive in another. The representation is the same as in Fig. 2. In particular,
the colored areas represent the basins of attraction, i.e. all initial conditions (p(0),q(0)) leading to the same stable fix point [red=(0,0), salmon=(u,0),
mustard=(v,1), rainbow colors=(u,v), with 0vu, vv1]. The model parameters are as follows: (A) |B|=|C|=1 and f=0.8, i.e. population 1 is more
powerful than population 2, (B) |C|=2|B|=2 and f=1/2, i.e. both populations are equally strong, (C) |C|=2|B|=2 and f=0.8, (D) 2|C|=|B|=2 and f=0.8.
(A) In the multi-population snowdrift game (MSD), a mixture of cooperative and uncooperative behaviors results in both populations, if |B|=|C|. (B)
For |B|v|C| and equally strong populations, everybody ends up with non-cooperative behavior in each population. (C) For |B|v|C| and f{1=2&0,
the weaker population 2 forms a ‘‘tacit alliance’’ with the minority of the stronger population 1 and opposes its majority. (D) Same as (C), but now, all
individuals in the weaker population 2 show their own preferred behavior after the occurrence of a ‘‘revolutionary’’ transition, during which the stable
stationary solution (the evolutionary equilibrium) changes discontinuously from (u,0) to (v,1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.g005
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related concepts [58]. For overviews see [63,83,85]. Yet, the
majority of these models investigate conditions under which
people comply with a preset norm. Repeated interactions [1] and
the sanctioning of non-conforming behavior [86] are two such
conditions. It was less clear, however, whether and how a
commonly shared norm would be established in situations, where
the involved populations prefer different norms.
Our own approach to understanding behavioral consensus
relates to evolutionary game theory, but in contrast to most models
for the evolution of norms, it assumes a heterogeneity of individual
preferences and therefore involves several populations. In Methods
and Discussion, we furthermore consider the role of sanctioning as a
mechanism that supports the evolution of norms, but point out
that there are other mechanisms which are expected to support the
evolution of norms as well. Note that the term ‘‘evolution’’ is used
by us in the sense of ‘‘temporal evolution’’ or ‘‘eventual
establishment’’, not in the sense of ‘‘biological evolution’’ or
‘‘spontaneous emergence’’.
Examples and classification of norms
In the following, we will illustrate the concept of social norms by
some examples. In his book ‘‘The Cement of Society’’, Jon Elster
[79] discusses consumption norms, norms against behavior
‘contrary to nature’, norms regulating the use of money, norms
of reciprocity, medical ethics, codes of honor, norms of retribution,
work norms, norms of cooperation, and norms of distribution.
Norms underlying common neighborhood or business practices
have been analyzed by Macaulay [87], Ostrom [88] and Ellickson
[69].
When discussing norms, it is useful to distinguish between
coordination norms and cooperation norms [83]. Coordination norms
are self-enforcing. They are established, when it is advantageous
for people to show a coordinated behavior, but it does not matter
which of the behavioral options people agree upon. In that case,
one also speaks of behavioral conventions, and one-population
models are often sufficient to describe the underlying dynamics
[61,89]. Examples of conventions are the preference of pedestrians
to walk on one side [61,90–93] (for example, the right-hand side in
continental Europe or the left-hand side in Japan), the direction of
writing, the way people greet each other (whether one gives a hand
and which one, whether one hugs or kisses the person and how
many times), the way people eat, the color of clothes worn by
political movements, and signs used by followers of certain ideas or
tastes to identify each other (e.g. tattoos or hanky codes).
In contrast to coordination norms, cooperation norms are not self-
enforcing, since there are incentives for unilateral deviance. In our
paper, we analyze situations, where people have different preferences,
so that at least a certain fraction of people is tempted to show non-
conforming behavior. Gender norms may serve for illustration.
Just imagine a ‘‘battle of the sexes’’ in a group of friends (rather than
between two players), where men prefer to watch soccer and
women prefer to see a cultural performance, to discuss a
stereotypical example. Note that, in our model, interactions occur
not only between men and women, but also among men and
among women, so the outcome will depend on their relative
power.
Religious norms constitute another case, where people with
incompatible preferences interact with each other. A similar thing
applies to legal norms, when people believing in a pluralistic civil
law system interact with people believing in a religious law system.
It is well-known that these law systems have incompatible
implications with regard to certain issues. A similar situation
applies, when businessmen from countries with different business
practices make a deal or people with different mother languages
meet. In our opinion, communicating in a language is not just a
coordination problem. Most people have a clear preference for
their mother tongue, and it shapes even the way of thinking and of
social interactions. Therefore, when people with different mother
tongues meet, there is an incentive to unilaterally deviate from
speaking the same language (e.g., due to differences in proficiency).
Nevertheless, a common (‘‘normative’’) language can establish, as is
impressively shown, for example, by the unification of regionally
spoken dialects in Germany triggered by the Luther bible. Note,
however, that proper language use does not seem to be fully self-
enforcing, otherwise lexica, schools, and related legal regulations
would not be needed.
Besides coordination and cooperation norms, it appears to make
sense to distinguish a third class of ‘‘hybrid norms’’, which share
features of both kinds of norms. This case occurs when it is costly to
switch the behavior (i.e. when transaction costs are high).
Technological norms may serve as an example. Customers will
usually profit from shared technical standards concerning, for
example, the type of keyboard (QWERTY or Dvorak) [94], the
kind of operating system (Windows vs. Mac OS or Linux), the
technology of video players (VHS vs. Beta MAX) [95] or high
resolution DVD players (blue-ray vs. HD DVD). In such cases,
customers do not have incentives to deviate from a technological
standard, once it has established everywhere. In the beginning,
however, a common standard does not evolve by itself, as
customers buy different technologies and are reluctant to give up
the technology they have invested in. Therefore, the use of a single
technology is not self-enforcing in the beginning. Once there is a
majority standard, however, most people will join it after some
time, and their preferences change accordingly.
One should also mention that some conventions or norms are set
by law, e.g. the driving side [89], or may involve an intentional
segregation from other groups (e.g. when groups develop their own
dress-codes or symbols such as tattoos). This touches issues of
group dynamics, which are beyond the scope of this paper. The
novel contribution of our model is that it sheds new light on the
problem of whether a norm can establish (under what conditions)
and how (in terms of the dynamics). There are even exact
mathematical results for this [46]. In particular, our model reveals
that the dynamics and finally resulting state of the system is not
only determined by the payoff structure. It also depends on the
power of populations and even on the initial proportions of
cooperative individuals (the initial conditions or previous history).
Within our model of the evolution of norms, one could say that
Figs. 3A,C,D represent the formation of coordination norms, as one
behavioral norm is always established (reflecting self-enforcement).
Figure 3B, in contrast, describes situations where two different
behaviors can coexist in a stable way (see the yellow basin of
attraction). Due to this lack of self-enforcement, it makes sense to
attribute this case to the problem of establishing a cooperation norm.
This relevant case can only occur, when taking into account self-
interactions in multi-population games. It is also interesting to
note, that the application of group pressure can transform the
problem of establishing a cooperation norm into the problem of
establishing a coordination norm (see Sec. Methods). Finally, the case
of hybrid norms can be treated by considering transaction costs in
our model.
Occurence of social polarization in the snowdrift game
Let us now turn our attention to the discussion of snowdrift
games. In the one-population case, there is one stable stationary point,
corresponding to a fraction p0 =|B|/(|B|+|C|) of cooperative
individuals (see Fig. 1). If this would be transferable to the multi-
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the limit of large times t??. Instead, we find a variety of different
outcomes, depending on the values of the model parameters B, C,
and f (see Fig. 5):
(a) The interactions between both populations shift the fraction of
cooperative individuals in each population to values different from p0.
If |B|=|C|, we discover a line of infinitely many stationary
points, and the actually resulting stationary solution uniquely
depends on the initial condition (see Fig. 5A). This line
satisfies the relation q=p only if f=1/2, while for most
parameter combinations we have q=p=p0. Nevertheless,
the typical outcome in the case |B|=|C| is characterized
by a finite fraction of cooperative individuals in each
population.
(b) Conflicting interactions between two equally strong groups destabilize the
stationary solution q=p=p0 of the one- population case, and both
populations lose control over the final outcome. For |B|=|C|, all
stationary points are discrete and located on the boundaries, and
only one of these points is an evolutionary equilibrium. If
both populations have equal power (f=1/2), we either end up
with non-cooperative behavior by everybody (if p0v1=2, see
Fig. 5B), or everybody is cooperative (if p0w1=2). Remark-
ably, there is no mixed stable solution between these two
extremes.
(c) The stronger population gains control over the weaker one, but shows
polarization itself, and a change of the model parameters may induce a
revolution. If |B|=|C| and population 1 is much stronger than
population 2 (i.e., f{1=2&0), we find a finite fraction of
cooperative individuals in the stronger population, while
either 0% or 100% of the individuals are cooperative in the
weaker population. A closer analysis reveals that the
resulting overall fraction of cooperative individuals fits
exactly the expectation p0 of the stronger population [46],
while from the perspective of the weaker population, the
overall fraction of cooperative individuals is largely different
from p0 =|B|/(|B|+|C|). Note that the stronger population
alone can not reach an overall level of cooperation of p0.
The desired outcome can only be produced by effectively
controlling the behavior of the weaker population. This takes
place in an unexpected way, namely by polarization: The
stronger population splits up into fractions of people showing
different behaviors, which may give rise to social differen-
tiation, inequality, and conflict. In the weaker population 2,
everyone either shows behavior 1 (namely for p0v1=2, see
Fig. 5C), otherwise everyone shows behavior 2 (see Fig. 5D).
There is no solution in between these two extremes (apart
from the special case p0~1=2 for |B|=|C|).
It comes as a further surprise that the behavior in the weaker
population is always coordinated with the minority behavior in the
stronger population. Due to the payoff structure of the multi-
population snowdrift game, it is profitable for the weaker
population to oppose the majority of the stronger population,
which creates a tacit alliance with its minority. Such antagonistic
behavior is well-known from protest movements [96] and finds
here a natural explanation.
Moreover, when |C| changes from values greater than |B|t o
values smaller than |B|, there is an unexpected, discontinuous
transition in the weaker population 2 from a state in which everybody
is cooperative from the point of view of population 1 to a state in
which everybody shows the own preferred behavior 2 (see Movie S3).
History and science [97] have seen many abrupt regime shifts of this
kind. Revolutions caused by class conflict provide ample empirical
evidence for their existence. Combining the theory of phase
transitions with ‘‘catastrophe theory’’ [98] offers a quantitative
scientific approach to interpret such revolutions as the outcome of
social interactions [99]. Here, their recurrence becomes understand-
able in a unified and simple game-theoretical framework.
Discussion
Multi-population game-dynamical replicator equations provide
an elegant and powerful approach to study the dynamics and
outcomes expected for populations with incompatible interests. A
detailed analysis reveals how combining interactions within and
between populations and considering differences in their power
can substantially change the dynamics of various game theoretical
dilemmas (compare Movies S2 and S3 with Movie S1).
Generalizations to more than 2 behaviors or groups and to different
payoffs for in- and out-group interactions are easily possible (see
Sec. Methods).
When two populations with incompatible preferences interact
among and between each other, we find the same stationary points
for the prisoner’s dilemma and the harmony game as for the
corresponding non-interactive games. In particular, interactions
across populations do not change the attractive solutions (Nash
equilibria) of these games. However, the behavior of the snowdrift
game and the stag hunt game changes completely, and their
dynamics is particularly interesting. For the interactive case, the
signs of the payoff-dependent parameters B and C do not only
determine the character of the game, but also the location and
stability of the stationary solutions, and the basins of attraction.
In the multi-population snowdrift game, for example, there is a
discontinuous (‘‘revolutionary’’) transition, when 12|B|/|C|
changes its sign. On top of this, the power f has a major influence
on the outcome, and the initial distribution of behaviors (and,
consequently, the previous history) can be crucial, also for the
multi-population stag hunt game. Note that such a rich system
behavior is already found for the simplest setting of our model and
that the concept of multi-population game-dynamical equations
may be generalized in various ways to address a number of
challenging questions in the future: How can we gain a better
understanding of a clash of cultures, the outbreak of civil wars, or
conflicts with ethnic or religious minorities? How can we
analytically study migration and group competition? When do
social systems become unstable and experience a polarization of
society? How can we understand the emergence of fairness norms
in bargaining situations?
Another interesting aspect of our model is that it makes a variety
of quantitative predictions. Therefore, it could be tested
experimentally with iterated games in the laboratory, involving
several groups of people with random matching and sufficiently
many iterations. Suitable changes in the payoff matrices should be
able to confirm the mathematical conditions under which different
archetypical types of social phenomena or discontinuous transi-
tions in the system behavior can occur: (1) the breakdown of
cooperation, (2) in-group cooperation (the formation of ‘‘sub-
cultures’’), (3) the evolution of shared behavioral norms, and (4)
societal polarization or conflict with the possibility of a
revolutionary regime shift. The findings are particularly important
to understand interactions between human populations with
different ethnic, cultural or religious backgrounds. However, they
are also relevant for social features within animal societies
[38,103–105] or even for interactions among bacteria [4,5].
The significant influence of the respective payoffs of social
interactions on the resulting outcome has crucial implications for
society, law and economics [62,106–115]. There, conflicts need to
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importance. For society, norms are equally important as
cooperation, since they reduce uncertainty, bargaining efforts,
and (potentially) also conflict in social interactions. They are like
social forces guiding our interactions in numerous situations and
subtle ways, creating an ‘‘invisible hand’’ kind of self-organization
of society [47]. Nevertheless, their ubiquity is quite surprising, as
norms require people to constrain self-interested behavior [116]
and to perform socially prescribed roles. Yet, widespread
cooperation-enhancing mechanisms such as direct reciprocity
due to repeated interactions [1] and indirect reciprocity based on
reputation [10] can transform a prisoner’s dilemma into stag hunt
interactions, see Fig. 6 [3,82,117].
This suggests a natural tendency towards the formation of
norms, whatever their content may be. Costly punishment can
support the evolution of norms in prisoner’s dilemma situations as
well (see Fig. 7A). Another way of promoting the preferred
coordinated behavior as commonly accepted norm is to transform
a prisoner’s dilemma situation into a stag hunt game in the own
population and to make sure that the population interacts with
another one with incompatible preferences and prisoner’s
dilemma interactions (see Fig. 7B). Accordingly, the sanctioning
of non-conforming behavior (see Sec. Methods for details) is not the
only mechanism to support the evolution of norms. Other
cooperation-enhancing mechanisms such as kin selection (based
on genetic relationship) and group selection tend to transform a
prisoner’s dilemma into a harmony game (see Fig. 6). Therefore,
genetic relatedness and group selection are not ideal mechanisms to
establish shared behavioral norms. They rather support the
formation of subcultures. Moreover, the transformation of
prisoner’s dilemma interactions into a snowdrift game is expected
to cause polarization or conflict (see Fig. 6).
The evolution of language [119] is another example for the
importance of norm-establishing social interactions, since success-
ful communication requires norms, how words are used (the
‘‘evolution of meaning’’) [120,121]. In this connection, it is
interesting to study whether the explosive development of
language and culture in humans is due to their ability to transform
interactions into norm-promoting stag hunt interactions. From this
point of view, repeated interactions thanks to human settlements,
the development of reputation mechanisms, and the invention of
punishment institutions should have largely accelerated cultural
evolution [122–124].
Another interesting research direction relates to the circum-
stance that people do not only follow norms—at the same time,
they also create norms. This touches the issue of norm emergence
[64,73,80,126–128]. In order to address it, one also has to answer
questions such as the following: How is the ‘‘content’’ of norms
generated or selected, i.e. how does the prescription of a
behavioral role or normative behavior come about [129]? How
and why do people start sanctioning non-conforming individuals,
although this is costly, and why is there a tendency towards
conformity at all [130]? This is beyond the scope of this paper.
The same applies to related questions such as the following: Do
norms always establish a ‘‘Pareto’’ or a ‘‘system optimum’’
[56,131–133]? Do norms always emerge, when they would be
‘‘functional’’ or beneficial [79,134]? Do they disappear, when they
are not beneficial anymore? Do norms reduce or produce conflicts
[31]? How can one explain local conformity, global diversity, and
punctuated equilibria [51]? These points will be addressed in a
forthcoming publication, while the goal of this manuscript was to
develop a unified theoretical concept allowing one to study the
interaction of populations with incompatible interests. This
became possible by analysis of multi-population game-dynamical
(replicator) equations, which have been used here to address,
besides the evolution of norms, the occurrence of polarization or
conflict, the outbreak of revolutions and several other relevant
questions, like the importance of the power of a population and of
Figure 6. Illustration of different routes to cooperation (through arrows), assuming particular reproduction-selection mechanisms
[3]. The direction of the arrows can be mathematically calculated [117]. Route 1 reflects the way in which the payoff-dependent parameters B and C
of the game (see Fig. 1) are effectively modified by kin selection (genetic relationship), network reciprocity (clustering of individuals showing the
same behavior), or group selection (competition between different groups). Route 2a corresponds to the effect of direct reciprocity (due to the
‘‘shadow of the future’’ through the likelihood of future interactions). Route 2b belongs to the mechanism of indirect reciprocity (based on reputation
effects), and route 2c reflects costly punishment. Route 3 results for certain kinds of network interactions [3,118].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.g006
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interactions.
Methods
Multi-population game-dynamical replicator equations
Multi-population game-dynamical replicator equations
[38,46,61] describe the temporal evolution of the proportions
pa
i (t) of individuals showing behavior i at time t in population a,
assuming that more successful behaviors spread, as these are
imitated by individuals of the same population at a rate
proportional to the increase in the expected success [61,92,135].
The expected success is determined from the frequency of
interactions between two behaviors i and j, and by the associated
payoffs Aab
ij . Focusing on the above-mentioned social dilemmas, in
the case of two interacting populations a, b [ {1, 2} and two
behavioral strategies i, j [ {1, 2}, we assume the following for
interactions within the same population a: If two interacting
individuals show the same behavior i, both will either receive the
payoff ra or pa. If we have ra=pa, we call the behavior with the
larger payoff ra ‘‘preferred’’ or ‘‘cooperative’’, the other behavior
‘‘non-cooperative’’ or ‘‘uncooperative’’. When one individual
chooses the cooperative behavior and the interaction partner is
uncooperative, the first one receives the payoff sa and the second
one the payoff ta. To model conflicts of interests, we assume that
population a=1 prefers behavior i=1 and population 2 prefers
behavior 2. Therefore, if an individual of population 1 meets an
individual belonging to population 2 and both show the same
behavior i=1, the first one will earn R1 and the second one P2,a s
behavior i=1 is considered uncooperative in population 2.
Analogously, for i=2 they earn P1 and R2. If the interaction
partners choose different behaviors i and j, they earn Sa, when the
behavior corresponds to their cooperative behavior, otherwise they
earn Ta [46]. In mathematical notation, the payoff matrix (A11
ij ) for
individuals belonging to population 1 in interactions with other
individuals of the same population is
Interaction partner0s behavior
j~1 (preferred) j~2
Focal i~1 (preferred) r1 s1
agent0s
behavior i~2 t1 p1
while the payoff matrix (A12
ij ) for interactions with individuals of
population 2 is
Interaction partner0s behavior
j~1 j~2 (preferred)
Focal i~1 (preferred) R1 S1
agent0s
behavior i~2 T1 P1
To reflect incompatible preferences of both populations, we
assume that the payoff matrix of individuals belonging to
population 2 is ‘‘inverted’’ or ‘‘mirrored’’. When interacting with
individuals of population 1, the related payoff matrix (A21
ij )i s
Interaction partner0s behavior
j~1 (preferred) j~2
Focal i~1 P2 T2
agent0s
behavior i~2 (preferred) S2 R2
while the payoff matrix (A22
ij ) when interacting with individuals of
Figure 7. Illustration of different ways to establish a behavioral norm. (A) Prisoner’s dilemma games with model parameters B=21, C=22,
when population 1 is much stronger than population 2 (f=0.8) and individuals of both populations apply costly punishment, whenever the
respective focal individual behaves cooperatively, but (from his or her perspective) the interaction partners does not [125]. The punishment cost was
assumed to be b=2.5, the punishment fine c=5b (see Sec. Methods for details). When starting with an initial condition in the blue or green areas,
costly punishment can establish a behavioral norm, corresponding to the asymptotically stable points at (0,1) and (1,0). When starting in the red area,
however, everybody in both populations will finally behave in a non-cooperative way, as indicated by the asymptotically stable point at (0,0). (B)
Population 1 playing a stag hunt game with model parameters B=21 and C=2, while individuals in population 2 experience prisoner’s dilemma
interactions with B=21 and C=22, assuming equally strong populations (f=0.5). All individuals are expected to end up with behavior 1, which is
preferred by population 1. However, as the flow line starting with the white circle and ending up in the asymptotically stable point (1,0) illustrates,
the evolution of the behavioral norm can take a long time and unexpected detours.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.g007
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Interaction partner0s behavior
j~1 j~2 (preferred)
Focal i~1 p2 t2
agent0s
behavior i~2 (preferred) s2 r2
Assuming constant preferences and fixed relative population
strengths fa, the resulting coupled game-dynamical replicator
equations for the temporal evolution of the proportion p(t)=p1
1(t)
of cooperative individuals in population 1 and the fraction
q(t)~q2 of cooperative individuals in population 2 become
dp(t)
dt
~
p(t)½1{p(t) 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
½b1fz(c1{b1)fp(t)zC1(1{f)z(B1{C1)(1{f)q(t) 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
saturation factors growth factor F(p,q) containing interaction effects
ð1Þ
and
dq(t)
dt
~
q(t)½1{q(t) 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
½b2(1{f)z(c2{b2)(1{f)q(t)zC2fz(B2{C2)fp(t) 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
saturation factors growth factor G(p,q) containing interaction effects
ð2Þ
Here, we have used the abbreviation f~f1~1{f2.A s
indicated above, this parameter can reflect the relative population
size of population 1. More generally, however, Aab
ij fb can be
considered to represent ‘‘effective payoffs’’, and f can be used to
model the ‘‘power’’ of population 1 (which may not only depend
on population size, but also on education, the availability of
weapons or technologies, and other factors). ba~sa{pa,
Ba~Sa{Pa, ca~ra{ta, and Ca~Ra{Ta are payoff-dependent
model parameters, which can be positive, negative, or zero. When
setting ba~Ba~B and ca~Ca~C for simplicity, the payoff
depends on the own behavior i and the behavior j of the
interaction partner only, but not on the population he/she belongs
to (i.e. in- and out-group interactions just determine whether an
interaction partner may be imitated or not, but they do not
influence the payoff). Given the values of B and C used in our
computer simulations, it is easily possible to construct related
payoff matrices. Fixing values for P (e.g. P~0) and for D~R{P,
we have R(P,D)~PzD, T(P,D)~R{C~PzD{C, and
S(P,D)~PzB.
In reality, in-group and out-group interactions may, of course,
affect the payoff as well. Such situations can be treated by choosing
different values for the lower-case and upper-case parameters. It is
obvious that this creates a multitude of additional cases, which
deserve to be investigated in detail. However, before doing so, one
first has to understand the basic case addressed in this study, which
is already quite complicated.
Specification of Costly Punishment and Effects of Group
Pressure
Let us now consider costly punishment analogously to the way it
was specified in Ref. [125]. Then, we have s1~S{b1, t1~T{c1,
S1~S{b1{c2, S2~S{b2{c1, t2~T{c2, s2~S{b2. This
specification assumes that someone who receives the low ‘‘sucker’s
payoff’’ S in the event of unilateral cooperation (from his/her point
of view), will punish the respective interaction partner immedi-
ately, which modifies the payoffs. The punishment performed by
an individual of population a reduces the payoff of his/her
interaction partner by the fine caw0. However, punishment is
costly (it needs some punishment effort), which reduces the
punisher’s payoff by baw0. Usually one assumes cawba. The
correspondingly changed payoffs imply the parameters
b1~B{b1, c1~Czc1, B1~B{b1{c2, C1~C and
b2~B{b2, c2~Czc2, B2~B{b2{c1, C2~C, which must
be inserted into Eqs. (1) and (2). Therefore, punishment transforms
the prisoner’s dilemma within a population into a stag hunt game,
when ca~Czcaw0, i.e. cawDCD. The interaction with the other
population remains a prisoner’s dilemma, since Bav0 and Cav0.
Altogether, costly punishment results in the modified two-
population game-dynamical equations
dp(t)
dt
~
p(t)½1{p(t) ½F(p,q){b1f½1{p(t) zc1fp(t){(b1zc2)(1{f)q(t) 
ð3Þ
and
dq(t)
dt
~
q(t)½1{q(t) ½G(p,q){b2(1{f)½1{q(t) zc2(1{f)q(t){(b2zc1)fp(t) 
ð4Þ
These can generate dp=dt§0 and dq=dt§0 even for the
prisoner’s dilemma with Bv0 and Cv0. While punishment in a
one-population prisoner’s dilemma can lead to cooperation [125], in
the multi-population case it can cause normative behavior (see green
and blue areas in Fig. 7A).
Rather than considering costly punishment as discussed before,
one may also consider that individuals can apply group pressure to
support conformity and discourage discoordinated behavior
[19,70]. That could be reflected by subtracting a value d from
the off-diagonal payoffs S and T or by adding d to the diagonal
elements R and P. This results in the effective model parameters
ba~Ba~B{d and ca~Ca~Czd [117]. Therefore, if the group
pressure d is large enough (namely, dw |C|), a prisoner’s dilemma
with Bv0 and Cv0 is transformed into a stag hunt game with
ba~Bav0 and ca~Caw0.
Discussion of Implicit Model Assumptions
Any model has some underlying model assumptions, and even
though they may not be exactly fulfilled, the resulting model can
be a useful approximation. The evolutionary game theoretical
model of this paper assumes that individuals show a certain
behavior and stick to it until they change it due to social learning
(e.g. imitation) or mutations (e.g. trial-and-error behavior). This
appears applicable to situations of routine choice [124] and to
situations, where individuals do not spend much time on analyzing
situations, but rather orient at what the others do. Crowd behavior
and certain kinds of public opinion formation seem to be good
examples for this [61]. The approach should also be applicable to
many kinds of culturally acquired behaviors, including a
considerable number of behavioral conventions and norms.
In contrast to evolutionary game theory, classical game theory
assumes complex, strategic decision-making processes based on
utility maximization. These decision-making processes usually
consider individual preferences of interaction partners and other
aspects. In spite of this difference, both approaches lead to
ð1Þ
ð2Þ
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should not matter for our main conclusions whether the analysis is
based on classical or evolutionary game theory. Indeed both kinds
of game-theoretical analysis are expected to show the four
archetypical types of system behaviors identified in our paper. In
this connection, it is interesting to note the following [2]:
1. Every Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the replicator
dynamics and the game-dynamical equation. (At a Nash
equilibrium, which may also correspond to a mixed strategy,
no player can improve the payoff by changing the strategy
unilaterally.)
2. Every (asymptotically or neutrally) stable fix point of the
replicator equation is a Nash equilibrium.
3. The fix points (and their stability properties) imply the main
conclusions of our paper, as they determine the features of the
system dynamics, which are reflected by the basins of attraction
and the flow lines.
Further assumptions underlying the multi-population evolution-
ary game-theoretical model become obvious in the mathematical
derivation of the equations. One- or multi-population replicator
equations may describe the spreading of more successful
individuals via a higher reproduction rate (see, e.g. [35]. However,
they may also reflect social learning, namely by the imitation of
more successful behaviors [46,61,92]. The above model equations
result in case of proportional imitation [61,135]. They assume that
interactions take place in large, well-mixed populations, usually
between different individuals. If effects of repeated interactions
(and, thereby, a ‘‘shadow of the future’’) shall be taken into
account, this can be done by modifying the payoffs accordingly
[3,117]. A similar thing applies to reputation effects, network
reciprocity, group selection, etc. (see also Fig. 6). It is furthermore
possible to generalize the approach to finite populations [136] and
to populations with spatial or network interactions (see, for
example, [14,137,138].
Entities belonging to different populations differ in two aspects:
They earn different payoffs, and they imitate different entities
(namely, better-performing entities belonging to the own popula-
tion, assuming that it would not necessarily be wise to copy
behaviors of individuals with different preferences and payoff
functions). If, additionally, in-group interactions shall be distin-
guished from out-group interactions (in the sense that not only the
actual behavior, but also the preferred behavior of the interaction
partner matters), one has to specify the parameters ba and ca
differently from the parameters Ba and Ca. In this way, one can
even consider cases, where both populations play different games
(see Fig. 7B).
Supporting Information
Movie S1 Vector fields (small arrows) and phase diagrams
(colored areas) for two interacting populations with incompatible
preferences (conflicting interactions), when population 1 is more
powerful than population 2 (f=0.8), i.e. population 1 is assumed to
be more powerful. The movie shows the situation for the two-
population snow-drift game (first half of the movie) and the two-
population stag hunt game (second half), when in-group
interactions are considered, while interactions between popula-
tions are neglected (ba=b, c a=c, B a=0=C a). Therefore, the
dynamics in each population is independent of the dynamics in the
other population. The size of the parameters B and C is varied
according to the relation C=2B
3. This serves to demonstrate the
parameter-dependence of the fix points and dynamics of both
games. The small moving dots illustrate trajectories. One can
clearly see the discontinuous transitions in the system behavior
when one of the parameters B, C, or 12|B|/|C| changes its sign.
In the snowdrift game, we find a stable fraction p0=|B|/
(|B|+|C|) of cooperative individuals in each population, i.e.
p=p 0=q. This stationary fix point corresponds to the large black
circle moving along the diagonal line. In the stag hunt game, the
fix point located on the diagonal line is unstable (see empty circle).
Therefore, trajectories move away from it. If the fraction of
cooperative individuals in a population is larger than p0, it will
grow further, otherwise it will continuously shrink. That is, each
population will either end up with 0% or 100% cooperative
individuals, depending on the initial conditions. Therefore, 2
2=4
stable fix points are possible - one in each corner. Further details: p
is the fraction of individuals in population 1 showing their
preferred, cooperative behavior 1, and q is the fraction of
cooperative individuals in population 2 showing their preferred
behavior 2. A fraction 12q of individuals in population 2 shows
the non-preferred behavior 1, and a fraction 12p of individuals in
population 1 shows behavior 2. The vector fields displays (dp/dt,
dq/dt), i.e. the direction and size of the expected temporal change
of the behavioral distribution, if the fractions of cooperative
individuals in populations 1 and 2 are p(t) and q(t). Trajectories are
representative flow lines (p(t), q(t)) as time t passes. The flow lines
move away from unstable stationary points (empty circles) and are
attracted towards stable stationary points (black circles). The
colored areas represent the basins of attraction, i.e. all initial
conditions (p(0), q(0)) leading to the same fix point [red=(0,0),
yellow=(1,1), blue=(0,1), green=(1,0), salmon=(u, 0), mus-
tard=(v, 1), other colors=(u, v), with 0,u, v,1]. Saddle points
(crosses) are attractive in one direction, but repulsive in another.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.s001 (6.66 MB
AVI)
Movie S2 Same as Movie S1, but while interactions between
both populations are considered, self-interactions are neglected
(ba=0=c a,B a=B, C a=C). The contrast to Movie S1 is
pronounced: In the snowdrift game (first half of the movie),
everybody is either cooperative or non-cooperative in both
populations now, corresponding to the stable fix points at (0,0)
and (1,1) (see black circles). In contrast, in the stag hunt game
(second half of the movie), the evolutionary equilibria are located
at (p, q)=(1, 0) and (p, q)=(0, 1). p=1 means that 100% of the
individuals in population 1 show behavior 1, while q=0 implies
that 0% of the individuals in in population 2 show behavior 2 (i.e.
all of them show behavior 1 as well). Therefore, we find the
establishment of a commonly shared behavior (the formation of a
behavioral norm).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.s002 (8.07 MB
MPG)
Movie S3 Same as Movie S1, but considering both, interactions
within and between the two populations. Assuming no difference
between in-group and out-group interactions, we have ba=B a=B
and ca=C a=C. While the multi-population stag hunt game (first
half of the movie) shows a tendency to establish a commonly
shared behavior (‘‘behavioral norm’’), the snowdrift game (second
half) rather delineates situations of conflict between both
populations. It is known that conflicts between two populations
may sometimes cause a ‘‘revolution’’. According to our interpre-
tation, this corresponds to the discontinuous transition of the
evolutionary equilibrium, when the background color turns from
salmon to mustard. The abrupt change of the q-coordinate from 0
to 1 means that all individuals in the weaker population show the
non-preferred behavior before the revolution, but their preferred
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|B| and |C| in the multi-population snowdrift game become the
same. (Note that there is no such revolutionary transition, when
individuals have compatible preferences.) The dynamics for two
interacting populations without self-interactions is clearly less
differentiated (see Movie S2). In particular, Movie S2 shows no
revolutionary transition in the snowdrift game. It also lacks cases
where the phase diagram of the stag hunt game displays three
different basins of attraction at the same time, corresponding to a
coexistence of three stable fix points. While two of them
correspond to the establishment of a commonly shared behavior
(a behavioral norm), the third point represents the formation of
different behaviors (separate ‘‘subcultures’’) in each population.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012530.s003 (10.15 MB
MPG)
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